A Model of Zeal?

The Gemara in Maseches Berachos (20a) records a conversation between Rav Papa and Abaye, in which Rav Papa asks Abaye why the earlier generations merited miracles while the later generations do not.  Abaye responds that the earlier generations sacrificed to sanctify God's Name, and thus merited miracles.  As an example of such meritorious action, the Gemara records that Rav Ada bar Ahava tore a garment off of a woman, apparently because it was an immodest garment, and, upon learning that the woman was not Jewish, paid her four hundred zuz.
Is Rav Ada's action a model of zeal?  Why is this incident identified as an example of a sacrifice to sanctify God's Name?  Such an action performed in contemporary times would be labeled a desecration of God's Name, not a sanctification!  Did Rav Ada have different values than we do, or was he operating under very different circumstances?  If the latter, in what way were the circumstances different, and what lesson can we learn from it today?

Things Overheard in the Synagogue

This generation has witnessed a proliferation of Torah literature, from Halachic treatises to Biblical exegeses.  Yet despite the outpouring of Jewish religious books, there is a major vacuum in Orthodox literature - the absence of religious poetry.  Well, I am happy to tell you that a good friend of mine, Rabbi Ira Bedzow, has begun to fill that void.
In "Things Overheard in the Synagogue," Rabbi Bedzow identifies religious, personal and social themes in a poetic style unparalleled in its ability to convey depth with simplicity.  Simple observations lead to complex introspection; natural feelings compel sophisticated reflections; and common conversations inspire philosophical insights.
Although titled "Things Overheard in the Synagogue," this book encompasses things overheard in the street, in the home, and things not overheard at all, but residing in the private, active mind of the author.  The concept of memory is analyzed (page 32); social interactions are dissected (e.g. page 51); and Biblical passages come alive (e.g. page 16) as a range of human experience is expressed through the prism of a thoughtful religious scholar.
This book is sure to resonate with the thinking Orthodox Jew.  Some of Rabbi Bedzow's emotions strike a common chord and express what many of us feel but are perhaps reluctant or unable to properly express.  Some of Rabbi Bedzow's thoughts are novel and will catch the reader off guard.  But all of them are eloquent and enjoyable to read.
The Orthodox world is indebted to Rabbi Bedzow for retrieving a long-lost art in rabbinic literature.  I thought Orthodox poetry was dead, but, apparently, there is an individual valiantly attempting to resuscitate it.
The book can be obtained at http://urimpublications.com/ or at http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_1?_encoding=UTF8&sort=relevancerank&search-alias=books&ie=UTF8&field-author=Ira%20Bedzow

The Minds of Women 1

Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah Perek 1 Halacha 13 writes: "...The sages commanded that one should not teach his daughter Torah, for the minds of most women are not conducive for learning, and they transform words of Torah to words of emptiness according to the poverty of their minds..."  Is this statement about the minds of women true?  Have the minds of women changed over the centuries?  Was their inferior mind a product of their inferior education?  If the minds of women today are not inferior, does the Halacha barring the teaching of Torah to women still apply?  Are we permitted to change a Halacha if the reason for it no longer applies?

To Serve and To Praise 15

In selicha 58, recited on Tzom Gedalyah, we address the Torah, and ask the Torah to pray to Hashem on our behalf.  Clearly, the Torah is not an entity that possesses free will.  What can such a prayer mean?
Perhaps we mean to stress the merit of Torah in the eyes of Hashem, and the merit that it grants to us when we study and observe it.  The paytan employs poetic imagery of the Torah as an entity to which we are directing our prayer in order to dramatize this lesson.
If so, perhaps this is also the meaning of the various selichos which are addressed to angels.  In order to stress the importance of invoking Hashem's mercy, the paytan depicts the selicha as an appeal to the angels of mercy themselves.  The real focus of the selicha, however, is on Hashem and His choice to bestow mercy, not on the angels, who are mere tools in His Hands.

To Serve and To Praise 14

Is free will absolute, or is it limited?  Perhaps people do not possess free will for every single decision that they make, but only for certain decisions.  Regarding many matters, people's decisions may be dictated by external circumstances.
If so, perhaps just as living humans are "coerced" by external circumstances to do certain things, the deceased may also be "coerced" to do certain things by external circumstances.  And perhaps one of those external circumstances is the assemblage of Jews at the graveyard.  Perhaps such an assemblage causes the deceased to pray on our behalf without the intervention of free will at all.

To Serve and To Praise 13

Maharal suggests that when the Gemara states that the Jews would assemble at the graveyard in order that the deceased ask Hashem for mercy on their behalf, it does not mean that the Jews would pray to the deceased for this, but rather, that the sight of the Jews' plight would naturally arouse within the deceased the desire to pray to Hashem on their behalf.
Does this imply that the deceased possess free will?  If so, shouldn't it be permitted to directly pray to the deceased, just as it is permitted to pray to those who are alive and possess free will?  If not, what does attendance at the graveyard accomplish, and how does it arouse the deceased to pray to Hashem on our behalf?

To Serve and To Praise 12

The Gemara in Taanis 16a records that during the series of communal fasts ordained on account of drought, the Jews would assemble in the graveyard.  One of the reasons that the Gemara offers for this practice is "so that the deceased pray for mercy on our behalf."  Does this practice violate Rambam's fifth principle?