The Minds of Women 1

Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah Perek 1 Halacha 13 writes: "...The sages commanded that one should not teach his daughter Torah, for the minds of most women are not conducive for learning, and they transform words of Torah to words of emptiness according to the poverty of their minds..."  Is this statement about the minds of women true?  Have the minds of women changed over the centuries?  Was their inferior mind a product of their inferior education?  If the minds of women today are not inferior, does the Halacha barring the teaching of Torah to women still apply?  Are we permitted to change a Halacha if the reason for it no longer applies?

To Serve and To Praise 15

In selicha 58, recited on Tzom Gedalyah, we address the Torah, and ask the Torah to pray to Hashem on our behalf.  Clearly, the Torah is not an entity that possesses free will.  What can such a prayer mean?
Perhaps we mean to stress the merit of Torah in the eyes of Hashem, and the merit that it grants to us when we study and observe it.  The paytan employs poetic imagery of the Torah as an entity to which we are directing our prayer in order to dramatize this lesson.
If so, perhaps this is also the meaning of the various selichos which are addressed to angels.  In order to stress the importance of invoking Hashem's mercy, the paytan depicts the selicha as an appeal to the angels of mercy themselves.  The real focus of the selicha, however, is on Hashem and His choice to bestow mercy, not on the angels, who are mere tools in His Hands.

To Serve and To Praise 14

Is free will absolute, or is it limited?  Perhaps people do not possess free will for every single decision that they make, but only for certain decisions.  Regarding many matters, people's decisions may be dictated by external circumstances.
If so, perhaps just as living humans are "coerced" by external circumstances to do certain things, the deceased may also be "coerced" to do certain things by external circumstances.  And perhaps one of those external circumstances is the assemblage of Jews at the graveyard.  Perhaps such an assemblage causes the deceased to pray on our behalf without the intervention of free will at all.

To Serve and To Praise 13

Maharal suggests that when the Gemara states that the Jews would assemble at the graveyard in order that the deceased ask Hashem for mercy on their behalf, it does not mean that the Jews would pray to the deceased for this, but rather, that the sight of the Jews' plight would naturally arouse within the deceased the desire to pray to Hashem on their behalf.
Does this imply that the deceased possess free will?  If so, shouldn't it be permitted to directly pray to the deceased, just as it is permitted to pray to those who are alive and possess free will?  If not, what does attendance at the graveyard accomplish, and how does it arouse the deceased to pray to Hashem on our behalf?

To Serve and To Praise 12

The Gemara in Taanis 16a records that during the series of communal fasts ordained on account of drought, the Jews would assemble in the graveyard.  One of the reasons that the Gemara offers for this practice is "so that the deceased pray for mercy on our behalf."  Does this practice violate Rambam's fifth principle?

To Serve and To Praise 11

In the siddur of Rav Yaakov Emden, it states that the stanza "Borchuni leshalom" in the song "Sholom Aleichem" is not a prayer to the angels to bless us, for it is strictly forbidden to pray to angels.  Rather, it is a command to the angels to bless us.
How does this solve the problem?  If angels do not have free will, and thus cannot decide whether or not to bless us, is it not heresy to command them to bless us?  If Hashem already commanded them to bless us, why the need for our own command?  And if Hashem did not command them to bless us, how can we instruct them to act of their own volition?  Are we not thereby ascribing false power to the angels?