Things Overheard in the Synagogue

This generation has witnessed a proliferation of Torah literature, from Halachic treatises to Biblical exegeses.  Yet despite the outpouring of Jewish religious books, there is a major vacuum in Orthodox literature - the absence of religious poetry.  Well, I am happy to tell you that a good friend of mine, Rabbi Ira Bedzow, has begun to fill that void.
In "Things Overheard in the Synagogue," Rabbi Bedzow identifies religious, personal and social themes in a poetic style unparalleled in its ability to convey depth with simplicity.  Simple observations lead to complex introspection; natural feelings compel sophisticated reflections; and common conversations inspire philosophical insights.
Although titled "Things Overheard in the Synagogue," this book encompasses things overheard in the street, in the home, and things not overheard at all, but residing in the private, active mind of the author.  The concept of memory is analyzed (page 32); social interactions are dissected (e.g. page 51); and Biblical passages come alive (e.g. page 16) as a range of human experience is expressed through the prism of a thoughtful religious scholar.
This book is sure to resonate with the thinking Orthodox Jew.  Some of Rabbi Bedzow's emotions strike a common chord and express what many of us feel but are perhaps reluctant or unable to properly express.  Some of Rabbi Bedzow's thoughts are novel and will catch the reader off guard.  But all of them are eloquent and enjoyable to read.
The Orthodox world is indebted to Rabbi Bedzow for retrieving a long-lost art in rabbinic literature.  I thought Orthodox poetry was dead, but, apparently, there is an individual valiantly attempting to resuscitate it.
The book can be obtained at http://urimpublications.com/ or at http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_1?_encoding=UTF8&sort=relevancerank&search-alias=books&ie=UTF8&field-author=Ira%20Bedzow

The Minds of Women 1

Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah Perek 1 Halacha 13 writes: "...The sages commanded that one should not teach his daughter Torah, for the minds of most women are not conducive for learning, and they transform words of Torah to words of emptiness according to the poverty of their minds..."  Is this statement about the minds of women true?  Have the minds of women changed over the centuries?  Was their inferior mind a product of their inferior education?  If the minds of women today are not inferior, does the Halacha barring the teaching of Torah to women still apply?  Are we permitted to change a Halacha if the reason for it no longer applies?

To Serve and To Praise 15

In selicha 58, recited on Tzom Gedalyah, we address the Torah, and ask the Torah to pray to Hashem on our behalf.  Clearly, the Torah is not an entity that possesses free will.  What can such a prayer mean?
Perhaps we mean to stress the merit of Torah in the eyes of Hashem, and the merit that it grants to us when we study and observe it.  The paytan employs poetic imagery of the Torah as an entity to which we are directing our prayer in order to dramatize this lesson.
If so, perhaps this is also the meaning of the various selichos which are addressed to angels.  In order to stress the importance of invoking Hashem's mercy, the paytan depicts the selicha as an appeal to the angels of mercy themselves.  The real focus of the selicha, however, is on Hashem and His choice to bestow mercy, not on the angels, who are mere tools in His Hands.

To Serve and To Praise 14

Is free will absolute, or is it limited?  Perhaps people do not possess free will for every single decision that they make, but only for certain decisions.  Regarding many matters, people's decisions may be dictated by external circumstances.
If so, perhaps just as living humans are "coerced" by external circumstances to do certain things, the deceased may also be "coerced" to do certain things by external circumstances.  And perhaps one of those external circumstances is the assemblage of Jews at the graveyard.  Perhaps such an assemblage causes the deceased to pray on our behalf without the intervention of free will at all.

To Serve and To Praise 13

Maharal suggests that when the Gemara states that the Jews would assemble at the graveyard in order that the deceased ask Hashem for mercy on their behalf, it does not mean that the Jews would pray to the deceased for this, but rather, that the sight of the Jews' plight would naturally arouse within the deceased the desire to pray to Hashem on their behalf.
Does this imply that the deceased possess free will?  If so, shouldn't it be permitted to directly pray to the deceased, just as it is permitted to pray to those who are alive and possess free will?  If not, what does attendance at the graveyard accomplish, and how does it arouse the deceased to pray to Hashem on our behalf?

To Serve and To Praise 12

The Gemara in Taanis 16a records that during the series of communal fasts ordained on account of drought, the Jews would assemble in the graveyard.  One of the reasons that the Gemara offers for this practice is "so that the deceased pray for mercy on our behalf."  Does this practice violate Rambam's fifth principle?

To Serve and To Praise 11

In the siddur of Rav Yaakov Emden, it states that the stanza "Borchuni leshalom" in the song "Sholom Aleichem" is not a prayer to the angels to bless us, for it is strictly forbidden to pray to angels.  Rather, it is a command to the angels to bless us.
How does this solve the problem?  If angels do not have free will, and thus cannot decide whether or not to bless us, is it not heresy to command them to bless us?  If Hashem already commanded them to bless us, why the need for our own command?  And if Hashem did not command them to bless us, how can we instruct them to act of their own volition?  Are we not thereby ascribing false power to the angels?

To Serve and To Praise 10

Perhaps the Gemara is not literally describing Calev's words of prayer.  Rather, it is expressing the great merit of the Avos, and the efficacy of that merit in assisting Calev's prayer.  It is as if Calev had directly addressed the Avos and requested their intervention - that is how powerful their merit contributes to the prayers of their descendants.
Is such a deviation from the Gemara's literal description appropriate?  Are we permitted to understand the Gemara as dramatizing the merit of the Avos rather than describing a historical account?

To Serve and To Praise 9

Bach in Yoreh De'ah, at the end of siman 217, cites Rav Chaim Paltiel, who claims that Calev was certainly not praying to the Patriarchs, as it is forbidden to address the deceased in prayer.  Rather, Calev was praying to Hashem, and he chose the gravesite of the Patriarchs as an appropriate location for his prayer because prayer is more effective in holy places.  Alternatively, Mishnah Berura, at the end of siman 581, writes that instead of addressing the deceased, one may ask Hashem to assist him in the merit of the deceased.
The language of the Gemara in Sotah (34b), however, indicates that Calev directly addressed the Patriarchs.  "He said to them, 'My fathers!  Pray for mercy on my behalf...'"  How can these two interpretations be reconciled with the language of the Gemara?

To Serve and To Praise 8

Every Friday night, many Jews recite "Sholom Aleichem," a greeting to the angels.  In the third stanza of "Sholom Aleichem," we ask the angels to bless us - "Borchuni lishalom, Malachei hashalom."  Is this request a violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of faith?

To Serve and To Praise 7

In the selichos recited before and during the Yomim Nora'im, prayers seem to be addressed to angels.  For example, every day of selichos concludes with "Machnisei rachamim," a prayer to the angels to intercede with Hashem on our behalf; "Malachei rachamim," also a prayer beseeching the angels to ask Hashem to have mercy on us; and "Midas harachamim," also recited at the end of Ne'ilah on Yom Kippur, begging the "Attribute of Mercy" to "overflow upon us" and "request mercy" of Hashem on our behalf.  Are these prayers in violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of Judaism?

To Serve and To Praise 6

In Maseches Sotah 34b, Rava records that Calev prostrated himself on the graves of the Avos and "he said to them: 'My forefathers, pray for me that I be saved from the plan of the spies!'"  The Gemara seems to approve of Calev's action.  Was Calev in violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of Judaism?

To Serve and To Praise 5

According to this explanation of Rambam, praying to the deceased is a violation of a fundamental principle of Judaism.  Are the masses of Jews that flock to the gravesides of the righteous in violation of this principle?  Do they have an alternate understanding of Rambam's words?  Do they disagree with Rambam?  Are they simply unaware of this principle?  Or are they doing something other than praying to the deceased?

To Serve and To Praise 4

Based on this idea, Rav Yakov Weinberg, the late Rosh Hayeshiva of Ner Yisrael, claimed that prayer that is directed toward deceased humans violates this fundamental principle of Rambam.  Once a person dies, he loses his free will, and is no different in this sense than celestial beings, who are completely dependent on the will of Hashem.  Just as it is forbidden to pray to celestial beings, as they have no independent power, so it is forbidden to pray to humans who have died, as they too no longer possess independent power.  It is only to live humans, who still possess free will, that it is permitted to pray and serve.
Similarly, it is only permitted to praise humans for what they have done with their free will during their lifetimes.  Praising them for that which is done by Hashem is tantamount to praising the stars for that which is in the hands of Hashem alone.

To Serve and To Praise 3

Perhaps it is perfectly permissible to serve and to praise humans since they have free will.  Likewise it is perfectly permissible to pray to humans, i.e. request humans to provide for one's needs, since humans, by virtue of their free will, are capable of providing for those needs.  To serve and to praise celestial beings, on the other hand, is tantamount to idolatry, for such service implies that the celestial beings act of their own free will, when in fact they are completely controlled by Hashem.  To pray to these beings would also constitute idolatry, for such prayer implies that these beings have the power to grant the object of the prayer.
According to this, it would likewise constitute idolatry to pray to a human for something which cannot be granted by any being other than Hashem, such as rain. Such a prayer would imply that the human has Divine power.
This is why Rambam only contrasts service of Hashem with service of celestial beings, and not with service of humans; because in many cases, it is permissible to serve humans. It is only the ascription of Divine power to humans that is actually forbidden, whereas the ascription of any independent power to celestial beings is forbidden.

To Serve and To Praise 2

Rambam continues his elaboration of the principle that Hashem is the only One Whom it is proper to serve and to praise by contrasting Hashem with natural forces and celestial beings, whom it is improper to serve and praise because they do not act with free will, but are completely dependent on the will of Hashem.  Is Hashem the only One Who acts independently?  What about human beings?  Humans have free will; is it then permitted to serve them?  And why didn't Rambam contrast service of Hashem with service of human beings?

To Serve and to Praise

In the fifth of Rambam's thirteen principles of faith, Rambam asserts that Hashem is the only One to Whom it is proper to serve and to praise.  (I'm talking about the real Rambam, not the 13 ani maamins in the siddur alleged to be based on Rambam)  Does this mean that it is forbidden to praise people?  Does it mean that it is forbidden to serve people?  Is there a difference between serving someone by bowing down to him and serving him a cup of coffee?  If so, what is the difference?

The Place Of Morality In Halacha 2

Although two witnesses are generally required by Halacha in order to establish the truth of an event, a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness that her husband died.  Moreover, witnesses that are ordinarily disqualified from testimony are accepted for testimony regarding the death of a woman's husband, as that testimony would allow her to remarry.
Why is this case an exception to the rule?  Is it not the moral consideration of the woman's plight that caused the sages to relax the Halachic requirements of testimony?  Does this indicate that moral considerations influence Halachic decisions?

Trust and Effort

Is it proper to exert minimal effort in the pursuit of a livelihood, and trust in G-d to endow that effort with success?  Or should one anticipate the potential failure of minimal effort, and increase effort to provide for multiple contingencies?

The Place of Morality in Halacha

Should Halachic decisions be influenced by moral considerations?  For example, in deciding between two litigants in a financial dispute, should a dayan take into consideration the moral rectitude of each litigant's position; or must his analysis be limited to strictly Halachic factors?  

Rational, Real, or Rubbish?

What is "ayin hara" - "the evil eye?"  Is it mere jealousy or is it some harmful metaphysical force?  Is it truly avoided by oral declarations and mystical practices?  Or is its contemporary treatment rooted in superstition and pagan culture?

Bli Ayin Hara

Many Jews, immediately following a statement about some positive element or development in their lives, such as the number of wonderful children that they have, say "bli ayin hara" - "without an evil eye."  What does that mean and what do they intend to accomplish with that statement?

Him or Us 2

In a previous post (March), we asked how Judaism can claim that God guides history, and at the same time claim that humans have free will.  If humans have free will, can't they choose to lead history in a direction contrary to God's plan?
Perhaps humans indeed control history, and what God does is merely provide humanity with opportunities to lead history in the desired direction.  God controls the range of options given to humans in their autonomous decision-making.  Would this approach be consistent with Jewish values?

Selfishness vs. Selflessness 3

Would promotion of the quality of selflessness be beneficial or detrimental to humanity?  If everyone would give whatever they have to others, would anyone survive?  If everyone would put the well-being of others at the forefront of their ambitions, would inventions be developed?  Would science progress?  Or would everyone be too busy taking care of everyone else?

Selfishness vs, Selflessness 2

Rambam in Peirush Hamishnayos (Avos 3:19) writes that if, for example, one has a thousand dollars to distribute to charity, it is better to give one hundred dollars to ten causes than to give one thousand dollars to a single cause.  Rambam's rationale is that multiple acts of giving have a greater impact on the giver than a single act of giving, no matter how significant the single act of giving is.
Is the development of selflessness a selfish endeavor?  Is it our own moral and spiritual benefit that we seek when we give to others, or is it the benefit of the recipient that we seek?  What is our primary motivation, and what ought our primary motivation be?

Functional Holiness

In explaining how Moshe Rabbeinu was justified in smashing the Tablets, Rav Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, in his sefer Meshech Chochma, writes that holiness is not an inherent quality, but rather a matter of function.  As soon as the luchos ceased to serve their function, they lost their holiness, and became mere slabs of stone.  As such, Moshe was fully entitled to smash them before the Jewish people in order to demonstrate this lesson to them.
Using our previous example, then, is a rabbi who observes his congregation misusing the function of its sefer torah entitled to publicly destroy it?

Pedagogical Sacrilege

Imagine a respected rabbi entering a room in which his congregation is acting inappropriately.  In a fit of rage, the rabbi throws the Torah scroll to the ground, tearing it in the process.  Is this a proper reaction?  And is it any different than Moshe's shattering of the luchos, which were written by Hashem Himself?

Is It All About Belief?

Rambam writes (Peirush Hamishnayos, Sanhedrin, Perek Cheilek) that one who believes in the 13 principles of faith but commits terrible sins all his life merits a portion in the World to Come, while one who denies even one of the 13 principles of faith forfeits his portion in the World to Come.  How are we to understand the notion that a mass murderer merits eternal life in the World to Come after being temporarily punished for his sins, while a kind, generous, pious and virtuous individual who does not believe in the eventual resurrection of the dead gets cut off from eternal reward?

Love or Indifference?

Generally, those who embrace other Jews regardless of their religious observance and do not critique their lifestyles are considered to be authentic practitioners of ahavas yisrael, love of fellow Jews.  In contrast, those who critique the lifestyles of others are considered to lack the quality of ahavas yisrael.  But doesn't real love of fellow Jews motivate one to ensure that their decisions are in their best interests?  Doesn't the lack of critique demonstrate a lack of concern?

Celebrating Death

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim siman 580) lists numerous days of the calendar upon which righteous individuals passed away, and rules that one should fast on these days, since the death of the righteous represents a tragedy for the Jewish people.  Why, then, do many groups within contemporary Orthodoxy treat the "yahrtzeit" of the righteous as days of joy and celebration - particularly Lag Ba'omer?

Innocuous or Insidious?

Superstitions and so-called "segulos" are gaining wide currency among the masses of contemporary Orthodoxy.  Should we allow such foolishness to proliferate, given its seeming harmlessness; or should we vigorously protest it, given the mass misrepresentation and distortion of Judaism that it entails?

Blind Acceptance

Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Hilchos Avodah Zara, Perek 2, Halacha 3) writes that it is Biblically prohibited to ask whether the fundamental principles of Judaism are true or not.  Does that mean that anyone who leads a kiruv seminar or attempts to ascertain the validity of his tradition is in violation of a Biblical prohibition?  How can we be obligated to base our lives on principles that we are not allowed to verify?

The Status of Divine Commands

Why are we obligated to follow God's commands?  Is it because He is more powerful than us?  Because He has a moral claim on our lives?  Because it will benefit us or save us from retribution?  Is it a matter of pragmatism or inherent moral necessity?

Valuable Precedence

The Mishnah (Horayos 3:7) rules that if a man and a woman are dying, and only one person can be saved, the man is saved before the woman.  Does this imply that men are more valuable than women, or is there another consideration at play here?

A Difficult Death Penalty

The Rambam in Hilchos Issurei Biah (12:10) rules that if a Jewish man has sexual relations with a non-Jew, even if the non-Jew is a three-year-old girl, she must be killed, because she was the cause of a Jew's sin.  How are we to understand this?  Why would a little girl be killed for an act for which she cannot possibly be held accountable? 

Difficult Punishment

The Gemara in Maseches Shabbos (32b) states that a man's wife or children may die as a punishment for his own sin.  How is this to be understood?  Why would Hashem punish a woman and/or her children for a sin that someone else committed?

Other Religions

Nobody can claim to objectively evaluate the truth or falsehood of a religion without studying the religion extensively and with an open eye.  Can we claim that other religions are false if we have never attempted such objective and honest study of them?  If not, should we conduct an objective and honest study of them?

Spirit of the Law?

Is it proper to circumvent Halachic requirements?  We sell chametz to non-Jews in order to circumvent the requirement to get rid of it; we write a prozbul in order to circumvent the cancellation of loans by shemittah.  Doesn't the Gemara bemoan the practice of bringing in produce in a way that technically exempts it from the requirement of maaser?  Are there criteria by which we can determine when it is appropriate to technically circumvent Halachic requirements and when it is not?

The Limits of Debt

Is a person entitled to give money to charity if he owes money to someone else?  If not, may a person give money to charity if he does not pay full tuition for his children's education?

The Source of Goodness

Religious people assume that it is good to fulfill the Will of God.  Is that because God wants us to do that which is good, or because the fact that God wants us to do a certain thing makes that thing good?  Is there an independent source of goodness to which the Will of God conforms, or does God's Will define goodness itself?

Dignity vs. Duty

In the Jewish marriage contract, the kesuba, the husband obligates himself to financially support his wife.  What if the only available means of supporting his wife is a job that he finds demeaning?  Is a husband obligated to sacrifice his dignity to fulfill his financial duties?

Authentic or Aspirational?

There is a widespread practice to adopt Halachic stringencies incommensurate with an individual's true spiritual level.  The detractors of this practice highlight its inherent inauthenticity.  Its supporters and practitioners claim that by acting as if one is on a lofty spiritual level, one will eventually come to actually achieve a lofty spiritual level.
So what does God want us to be: authentic or aspirational?  To express our real selves or our ideal selves?

Gay Service?

Rav Tzadok Hakohen Melublin writes that every evil inclination can be channeled to good ends, and utilized positively in the service of Hashem.  If so, how do we explain the homosexual drive?  How can the homosexual drive be utilized positively in the service of Hashem?

Defending By Accusing

It has become common practice in contemporary rabbinic literature to resolve ancient Talmudic and medieval disputes by positing that both opinions are essentially true, and each position merely highlights a different aspect of the same core principle.  In asserting that both opinions are true, the implication is that the proponents of both opinions erred in stating that the opposing position is categorically wrong.  Is it better to defend both positions as truthful, implying that the proponents of those positions are both in error, or to acknowledge that one position is right, and the other is wrong?

Are We Moral?

How can we justify purchasing a second shirt with money that can be sent to a homeless family in Japan?  How can we buy a cell phone with money that can be sent to a starving child in Africa?  How can we purchase a second car with money that can be sent to a poverty-stricken widow down the block?

Holy or Inappropriate?

Is it appropriate to read the narratives of the Torah, with all of their violent and sexual details, to young children?  These details often comprise the main part of the narrative - Cain and Abel, Yehudah and Tamar, Dinah, etc.  Were these passages of the Torah only meant for adults?

Belief or Kindness?

Jew A believes in God and in the Divine origin of the Torah, but is nasty and cruel to his fellow human beings.  Jew B does not believe in the fundamentals of Judaism, but is kind and considerate to his fellow human beings.  Who is more favorable in God's eyes? 

Outreach or Honesty?

There are many statements in traditional Jewish sources that conflict with modern sensibilities.  When teaching modern Jewish Americans who are contemplating religious commitment, should we conceal these sources from them, lest they be impeded in their religious progress?  If we are questioned about them, should we distort their meaning to conform to modern sensibilities, for the purpose of encouraging religious observance? 

Him or Us?

Judaism seems to assert two contradictory beliefs.  On one hand, it asserts that God guides history; on the other hand, it asserts that humans have free will.  If humans have free will, can't they choose to move history in a direction contrary to God's plan?

The Jewish Role

Imagine two candidates running for President.  Candidate A is more sympathetic to Jewish causes, but advocates values that are antithetical to Judaism.  Candidate B is indifferent to Jewish causes, but advocates values that conform to Judaism.
Which candidate should Jews support?  Is the role of Jews in contemporary American society to advance their own interests, or to promote their religious values?

Setting Our Children Up For Disaster

Pick up any popular story book for Jewish children, or listen to any popular stories for Jewish children, and you will discover a consistent theme: If you do what is right, things will work out your way in the end.  Children who absorb such a message are bound for disaster when they experience the harsh reality that even if they do what is right, things don't always work out their way.  Why is this educational theme being perpetuated?

Is Prayer Meaningful?

If God always does what is best for us, is prayer relevant?  If the object of our request is good for us, God would grant it to us even if we don't pray; if it is not good for us, He would not grant it to us despite prayer.  What, then, is the purpose of prayer?  Are we perhaps informing God of something He does not already know?

A Common Competition

Imagine that there is one available position in a lucrative business, and two people, A and B, are competing for the position.  Person A makes fifteen phone calls to influential businessmen associated with this particular business, requests an interview, works two days on preparing an attractive resume, but does not think even once about God.  Person B invests only minimal natural effort, just sufficient to avoid requiring a miracle to attain the position, but spends two weeks in supplication before God, begging Him to grant him the position, and trusting that God will fulfill his request.
Who is more likely to get the position?

Strange Gratitude

We express gratitude to God for saving us from dangerous situations.  But isn't God the One Who places us in those situations in the first place?  If someone pushes you off a cliff and then pulls you back just in time, do you thank him for saving your life?

Selfish or Selfless?

Since God had no need to create the world, His act of creation is considered to be the ultimate act of selflessness, purely for the benefit of His creatures.  We are enjoined to emulate God's constant manifestations of selflessness, and thereby connect to Him, as it were.
On the other hand, the Gemara (Bava Metzia 62a) rules that if you are stranded on a desert island with a companion, and possess only enough water for one person, "your life takes precedence."  When it really counts, selfishness seems to be the advised course.
So what is the primary Jewish value - selfishness or selflessness?

Tolerant or Uncertain?

Does tolerance stem from a recognition that other viewpoints may be correct?  Does intolerance stem from a conviction that no other viewpoint is correct?
If so, does the difference between tolerant and intolerant people lie in the degree of certainty in their respective positions?  Perhaps tolerant people are uncertain of their positions, while intolerant people are certain of their positions.  The tolerant view the intolerant as arrogant in presuming that their position is certain, while the intolerant view the tolerant as equivocal and incapable of staking out firm positions.
Where do you stand?  Are you tolerant, and if you are, does your tolerance stem from uncertainty?

Interpreting Tragedies

The Torah repeatedly warns us that if we behave inappropriately, we will suffer misfortune, and if we behave appropriately, we will enjoy success.  If we suffer the very misfortunes that the Torah identifies as a result of sin, may we attribute those misfortunes to our sins?  Or is such attribution an arrogant assumption of prophetic power?
Similarly, if we enjoy success, may we attribute it to our righteousness, or is this too an unwarranted presumption of access to knowledge reserved for the Divine?

Good But Wrong?

Is there a distinction between something that is right and something that is good?  Can a right action be bad, or a wrong action be good?
The Gemara (Nazir 23) discusses the concept of aveirah lishmah, of transgressions committed with positive intentions.  The Gemara praises those who commit these "good transgressions."  If they are real transgressions, without any Halachic justification, they must be wrong.  But perhaps it is sometimes good to do the wrong thing.

Does God Care?

According to most Jewish thinkers, God is completely removed from any human attributes.  He is not anthropomorphic; He does not possess any physical characteristics.  And He is not anthropopathic; He does not possess any emotions.  Yet despite God's ultimate transcendence, we human beings are expected to develop a personal relationship with Him.
Is it possible to develop a personal relationship with a Being Who lacks emotions?  If God does not care about me; does not love me; does not feel anything at all about me - how can I personally relate to Him?
Some thinkers respond that even though God does not have emotions, He relates to us as if He has emotions.  But does this argument satisfy you? Are you comfortable having a relationship with Someone Who acts as if He cares about you, but does not really care about you?

Safe or Effective?

One of the crucial ideological divisions between Chareidi Orthodoxy and Modern Orthodoxy stems from the question of whether it is better to be safe or effective.  Modern Orthodoxy maintains that in order to positively influence other Jews, we must associate with them; Chareidi Orthodoxy points to the potential pitfalls of such associations.  Modern Orthodoxy maintains that in order to fulfill Yeshayahu's designation as "a light unto the nations," we must interact with the outside world; Chareidi Orthodoxy points out the inherent dangers of such interaction.  Modern Orthodoxy claims that secular disciplines enhance our understanding of Torah; Chareidi Orthodoxy points to the corruption that may result from absorbing secular material.  The debate is not whether these pursuits are effective, but whether it is worth sacrificing spiritual safety for their effectiveness.  Chareidim downplay the value of these pursuits, while Modern Orthodox downplay their danger; but these are merely attempts to avoid the real issue - whether it is better to be safe or effective.
How do we live and how do we train our children to live?  Do we attempt to make a positive difference in the world by changing the status quo, or by doing our best within the security of established norms?  How do we live, and, more importantly, how ought we live?

The Mystery of Revelation

According to many Jewish thinkers, the rational basis of our belief in the truth of the Torah is the national experience of Divine revelation at Mount Sinai.  This is viewed as national testimony to the Divine authorship of the Torah.  Here are a few things to consider.
1) How did our ancestors know that it was G-d speaking to them at Mount Sinai?  As we all know, G-d has no physical form, so what exactly did they see on Mount Sinai?  The Torah describes a cloud, smoke and fire descending upon the mountain; why did our ancestors assume that the cloud, smoke and fire represented G-d?  If they experienced prophecy, the Torah does not describe it as such.  No other prophecy required such an awesome demonstration to prove its authenticity.  What, then, did they see that convinced them of the Divine Source of the revelation?
2) The generation of Jews that received the Torah had many crises of faith throughout their travels in the wilderness. If the people who actually witnessed the revelation of G-d at Mount Sinai could later doubt the fundamentals of religious doctrine, how can we, so many generations later, possibly be expected to be steadfast in our religious convictions?

Can We Force Ourselves To Believe?

The Rambam writes (Peirush Hamishnayos to Sanhedrin Perek 10) that anyone who does not believe in his thirteen principles of faith forfeits his share in the World to Come.  What if someone is not convinced of the truth of all of the thirteen principles of faith, but does not want to lose his share in the World to Come?  Can such a person force himself to believe in them even though he has not been intellectually convinced of them?  If he forces himself to believe, does he really believe?