Perhaps the Gemara is not literally describing Calev's words of prayer. Rather, it is expressing the great merit of the Avos, and the efficacy of that merit in assisting Calev's prayer. It is as if Calev had directly addressed the Avos and requested their intervention - that is how powerful their merit contributes to the prayers of their descendants.
Is such a deviation from the Gemara's literal description appropriate? Are we permitted to understand the Gemara as dramatizing the merit of the Avos rather than describing a historical account?
Sunday, July 31, 2011
Friday, July 29, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 9
Bach in Yoreh De'ah, at the end of siman 217, cites Rav Chaim Paltiel, who claims that Calev was certainly not praying to the Patriarchs, as it is forbidden to address the deceased in prayer. Rather, Calev was praying to Hashem, and he chose the gravesite of the Patriarchs as an appropriate location for his prayer because prayer is more effective in holy places. Alternatively, Mishnah Berura, at the end of siman 581, writes that instead of addressing the deceased, one may ask Hashem to assist him in the merit of the deceased.
The language of the Gemara in Sotah (34b), however, indicates that Calev directly addressed the Patriarchs. "He said to them, 'My fathers! Pray for mercy on my behalf...'" How can these two interpretations be reconciled with the language of the Gemara?
The language of the Gemara in Sotah (34b), however, indicates that Calev directly addressed the Patriarchs. "He said to them, 'My fathers! Pray for mercy on my behalf...'" How can these two interpretations be reconciled with the language of the Gemara?
Thursday, July 28, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 8
Every Friday night, many Jews recite "Sholom Aleichem," a greeting to the angels. In the third stanza of "Sholom Aleichem," we ask the angels to bless us - "Borchuni lishalom, Malachei hashalom." Is this request a violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of faith?
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 7
In the selichos recited before and during the Yomim Nora'im, prayers seem to be addressed to angels. For example, every day of selichos concludes with "Machnisei rachamim," a prayer to the angels to intercede with Hashem on our behalf; "Malachei rachamim," also a prayer beseeching the angels to ask Hashem to have mercy on us; and "Midas harachamim," also recited at the end of Ne'ilah on Yom Kippur, begging the "Attribute of Mercy" to "overflow upon us" and "request mercy" of Hashem on our behalf. Are these prayers in violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of Judaism?
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 6
In Maseches Sotah 34b, Rava records that Calev prostrated himself on the graves of the Avos and "he said to them: 'My forefathers, pray for me that I be saved from the plan of the spies!'" The Gemara seems to approve of Calev's action. Was Calev in violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of Judaism?
Monday, July 25, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 5
According to this explanation of Rambam, praying to the deceased is a violation of a fundamental principle of Judaism. Are the masses of Jews that flock to the gravesides of the righteous in violation of this principle? Do they have an alternate understanding of Rambam's words? Do they disagree with Rambam? Are they simply unaware of this principle? Or are they doing something other than praying to the deceased?
Sunday, July 24, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 4
Based on this idea, Rav Yakov Weinberg, the late Rosh Hayeshiva of Ner Yisrael, claimed that prayer that is directed toward deceased humans violates this fundamental principle of Rambam. Once a person dies, he loses his free will, and is no different in this sense than celestial beings, who are completely dependent on the will of Hashem. Just as it is forbidden to pray to celestial beings, as they have no independent power, so it is forbidden to pray to humans who have died, as they too no longer possess independent power. It is only to live humans, who still possess free will, that it is permitted to pray and serve.
Similarly, it is only permitted to praise humans for what they have done with their free will during their lifetimes. Praising them for that which is done by Hashem is tantamount to praising the stars for that which is in the hands of Hashem alone.
Similarly, it is only permitted to praise humans for what they have done with their free will during their lifetimes. Praising them for that which is done by Hashem is tantamount to praising the stars for that which is in the hands of Hashem alone.
Saturday, July 23, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 3
Perhaps it is perfectly permissible to serve and to praise humans since they have free will. Likewise it is perfectly permissible to pray to humans, i.e. request humans to provide for one's needs, since humans, by virtue of their free will, are capable of providing for those needs. To serve and to praise celestial beings, on the other hand, is tantamount to idolatry, for such service implies that the celestial beings act of their own free will, when in fact they are completely controlled by Hashem. To pray to these beings would also constitute idolatry, for such prayer implies that these beings have the power to grant the object of the prayer.
According to this, it would likewise constitute idolatry to pray to a human for something which cannot be granted by any being other than Hashem, such as rain. Such a prayer would imply that the human has Divine power.
This is why Rambam only contrasts service of Hashem with service of celestial beings, and not with service of humans; because in many cases, it is permissible to serve humans. It is only the ascription of Divine power to humans that is actually forbidden, whereas the ascription of any independent power to celestial beings is forbidden.
According to this, it would likewise constitute idolatry to pray to a human for something which cannot be granted by any being other than Hashem, such as rain. Such a prayer would imply that the human has Divine power.
This is why Rambam only contrasts service of Hashem with service of celestial beings, and not with service of humans; because in many cases, it is permissible to serve humans. It is only the ascription of Divine power to humans that is actually forbidden, whereas the ascription of any independent power to celestial beings is forbidden.
Friday, July 22, 2011
To Serve and To Praise 2
Rambam continues his elaboration of the principle that Hashem is the only One Whom it is proper to serve and to praise by contrasting Hashem with natural forces and celestial beings, whom it is improper to serve and praise because they do not act with free will, but are completely dependent on the will of Hashem. Is Hashem the only One Who acts independently? What about human beings? Humans have free will; is it then permitted to serve them? And why didn't Rambam contrast service of Hashem with service of human beings?
Thursday, July 21, 2011
To Serve and to Praise
In the fifth of Rambam's thirteen principles of faith, Rambam asserts that Hashem is the only One to Whom it is proper to serve and to praise. (I'm talking about the real Rambam, not the 13 ani maamins in the siddur alleged to be based on Rambam) Does this mean that it is forbidden to praise people? Does it mean that it is forbidden to serve people? Is there a difference between serving someone by bowing down to him and serving him a cup of coffee? If so, what is the difference?
Wednesday, July 20, 2011
The Place Of Morality In Halacha 2
Although two witnesses are generally required by Halacha in order to establish the truth of an event, a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness that her husband died. Moreover, witnesses that are ordinarily disqualified from testimony are accepted for testimony regarding the death of a woman's husband, as that testimony would allow her to remarry.
Why is this case an exception to the rule? Is it not the moral consideration of the woman's plight that caused the sages to relax the Halachic requirements of testimony? Does this indicate that moral considerations influence Halachic decisions?
Why is this case an exception to the rule? Is it not the moral consideration of the woman's plight that caused the sages to relax the Halachic requirements of testimony? Does this indicate that moral considerations influence Halachic decisions?
Tuesday, July 19, 2011
Trust and Effort
Is it proper to exert minimal effort in the pursuit of a livelihood, and trust in G-d to endow that effort with success? Or should one anticipate the potential failure of minimal effort, and increase effort to provide for multiple contingencies?
Saturday, July 9, 2011
The Place of Morality in Halacha
Should Halachic decisions be influenced by moral considerations? For example, in deciding between two litigants in a financial dispute, should a dayan take into consideration the moral rectitude of each litigant's position; or must his analysis be limited to strictly Halachic factors?
Thursday, July 7, 2011
Rational, Real, or Rubbish?
What is "ayin hara" - "the evil eye?" Is it mere jealousy or is it some harmful metaphysical force? Is it truly avoided by oral declarations and mystical practices? Or is its contemporary treatment rooted in superstition and pagan culture?
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Bli Ayin Hara
Many Jews, immediately following a statement about some positive element or development in their lives, such as the number of wonderful children that they have, say "bli ayin hara" - "without an evil eye." What does that mean and what do they intend to accomplish with that statement?
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