Perhaps it is perfectly permissible to serve and to praise humans since they have free will. Likewise it is perfectly permissible to pray to humans, i.e. request humans to provide for one's needs, since humans, by virtue of their free will, are capable of providing for those needs. To serve and to praise celestial beings, on the other hand, is tantamount to idolatry, for such service implies that the celestial beings act of their own free will, when in fact they are completely controlled by Hashem. To pray to these beings would also constitute idolatry, for such prayer implies that these beings have the power to grant the object of the prayer.
According to this, it would likewise constitute idolatry to pray to a human for something which cannot be granted by any being other than Hashem, such as rain. Such a prayer would imply that the human has Divine power.
This is why Rambam only contrasts service of Hashem with service of celestial beings, and not with service of humans; because in many cases, it is permissible to serve humans. It is only the ascription of Divine power to humans that is actually forbidden, whereas the ascription of any independent power to celestial beings is forbidden.
According to this formulation, Avodah Zara is broadly defined as ascribing an ability or power to any entity (aside from God) which the entity does not contain. Man does not have the ability to cause rain, thus assuming (and acting upon the assumption) that Man causes rain would be heresy. Spiritual beings also do not contain any inherent ability (God merely uses them as vehicles for his will), thus ascribing any ability to them is heresy.
ReplyDeleteHow far does this extend; would you argue that the belief that a politician can change a certain social or political trend which he in reality he cannot be heresy? Or a patient's mistaken belief that the doctor be able to heal him when in reality he is on his deathbed; is that heresy?
It is also worthwhile to take note of the Rambam in Hilchos Avodah Zara (3:6) where he writes that if one serves an idol out of fear that the idol will cause him harm, he is not liable, so long as the worshiper does not accept that idol as a God. Although other commentaries (such as the Rivash #110 and Meiri Sanhedrin 61:) argue with the Rambam and posit that "out of fear of the idol" is also considered idolatry, it is clear that according to the Rambam the ascribing of power alone is not the primary issue.
Mistakenly believing that a politician can change a social trend is not a mistake concerning the inherent power of a politician; rather, it is a mistake in the assessment of the particular social situation and the particular circumstances of the politician. Believing that a human can bring rain, on the other hand, is a mistake concerning the inherent power of a human being qua human being; that may in fact constitute idolatry.
ReplyDeleteThe statement of Rambam that you reference regarding serving out of fear may be analogous to the law that one who serves idolatry out of compulsion is not liable; such a ruling does not imply that such action is permitted or even that it does not constitute idolatry.