Although two witnesses are generally required by Halacha in order to establish the truth of an event, a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness that her husband died. Moreover, witnesses that are ordinarily disqualified from testimony are accepted for testimony regarding the death of a woman's husband, as that testimony would allow her to remarry.
Why is this case an exception to the rule? Is it not the moral consideration of the woman's plight that caused the sages to relax the Halachic requirements of testimony? Does this indicate that moral considerations influence Halachic decisions?
The gemara (Yevamos 115) says it's because it's milsa d'avida l'gilui if the husband isn't really dead. Where do you see that mercy was the motivation for it?
ReplyDeleteNot to say that Chazal don't sometimes make halachos based on mercy, but they tell us when they do. And that sort of is their prerogative when writing the halachos. This is very different than us re-writing it to suit our morality.
The Torah explicitly requires two witnesses, especially for davar sheb'erva. In purely Halachic terms, it is difficult to see how a sevara alone can overturn that requirement. I am not talking about "rewriting Halacha" at all, only about the many situations regarding which there is no clear Halachic ruling.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure about that's so cut and dried. We also have a klal of eid echad ne'eman b'issurim. Eating tarfus is pretty sever also (let's say dom or chametz on pesach, so you have a nice issur kareis).
ReplyDeleteAnyway, my point is that chazal are basing it on the ease of falsifiability, not morality, so you have no proof from there.
I agree that it is not a proof, and you raise very good points. I am still not convinced, however, that moral considerations were not a part of the calculation. And even if this particular situation is not a good example of it, the general question of morality's role in Halacha still stands.
ReplyDelete