A Model of Zeal?

The Gemara in Maseches Berachos (20a) records a conversation between Rav Papa and Abaye, in which Rav Papa asks Abaye why the earlier generations merited miracles while the later generations do not.  Abaye responds that the earlier generations sacrificed to sanctify God's Name, and thus merited miracles.  As an example of such meritorious action, the Gemara records that Rav Ada bar Ahava tore a garment off of a woman, apparently because it was an immodest garment, and, upon learning that the woman was not Jewish, paid her four hundred zuz.
Is Rav Ada's action a model of zeal?  Why is this incident identified as an example of a sacrifice to sanctify God's Name?  Such an action performed in contemporary times would be labeled a desecration of God's Name, not a sanctification!  Did Rav Ada have different values than we do, or was he operating under very different circumstances?  If the latter, in what way were the circumstances different, and what lesson can we learn from it today?

Things Overheard in the Synagogue

This generation has witnessed a proliferation of Torah literature, from Halachic treatises to Biblical exegeses.  Yet despite the outpouring of Jewish religious books, there is a major vacuum in Orthodox literature - the absence of religious poetry.  Well, I am happy to tell you that a good friend of mine, Rabbi Ira Bedzow, has begun to fill that void.
In "Things Overheard in the Synagogue," Rabbi Bedzow identifies religious, personal and social themes in a poetic style unparalleled in its ability to convey depth with simplicity.  Simple observations lead to complex introspection; natural feelings compel sophisticated reflections; and common conversations inspire philosophical insights.
Although titled "Things Overheard in the Synagogue," this book encompasses things overheard in the street, in the home, and things not overheard at all, but residing in the private, active mind of the author.  The concept of memory is analyzed (page 32); social interactions are dissected (e.g. page 51); and Biblical passages come alive (e.g. page 16) as a range of human experience is expressed through the prism of a thoughtful religious scholar.
This book is sure to resonate with the thinking Orthodox Jew.  Some of Rabbi Bedzow's emotions strike a common chord and express what many of us feel but are perhaps reluctant or unable to properly express.  Some of Rabbi Bedzow's thoughts are novel and will catch the reader off guard.  But all of them are eloquent and enjoyable to read.
The Orthodox world is indebted to Rabbi Bedzow for retrieving a long-lost art in rabbinic literature.  I thought Orthodox poetry was dead, but, apparently, there is an individual valiantly attempting to resuscitate it.
The book can be obtained at http://urimpublications.com/ or at http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_1?_encoding=UTF8&sort=relevancerank&search-alias=books&ie=UTF8&field-author=Ira%20Bedzow

The Minds of Women 1

Rambam in Hilchos Talmud Torah Perek 1 Halacha 13 writes: "...The sages commanded that one should not teach his daughter Torah, for the minds of most women are not conducive for learning, and they transform words of Torah to words of emptiness according to the poverty of their minds..."  Is this statement about the minds of women true?  Have the minds of women changed over the centuries?  Was their inferior mind a product of their inferior education?  If the minds of women today are not inferior, does the Halacha barring the teaching of Torah to women still apply?  Are we permitted to change a Halacha if the reason for it no longer applies?

To Serve and To Praise 15

In selicha 58, recited on Tzom Gedalyah, we address the Torah, and ask the Torah to pray to Hashem on our behalf.  Clearly, the Torah is not an entity that possesses free will.  What can such a prayer mean?
Perhaps we mean to stress the merit of Torah in the eyes of Hashem, and the merit that it grants to us when we study and observe it.  The paytan employs poetic imagery of the Torah as an entity to which we are directing our prayer in order to dramatize this lesson.
If so, perhaps this is also the meaning of the various selichos which are addressed to angels.  In order to stress the importance of invoking Hashem's mercy, the paytan depicts the selicha as an appeal to the angels of mercy themselves.  The real focus of the selicha, however, is on Hashem and His choice to bestow mercy, not on the angels, who are mere tools in His Hands.

To Serve and To Praise 14

Is free will absolute, or is it limited?  Perhaps people do not possess free will for every single decision that they make, but only for certain decisions.  Regarding many matters, people's decisions may be dictated by external circumstances.
If so, perhaps just as living humans are "coerced" by external circumstances to do certain things, the deceased may also be "coerced" to do certain things by external circumstances.  And perhaps one of those external circumstances is the assemblage of Jews at the graveyard.  Perhaps such an assemblage causes the deceased to pray on our behalf without the intervention of free will at all.

To Serve and To Praise 13

Maharal suggests that when the Gemara states that the Jews would assemble at the graveyard in order that the deceased ask Hashem for mercy on their behalf, it does not mean that the Jews would pray to the deceased for this, but rather, that the sight of the Jews' plight would naturally arouse within the deceased the desire to pray to Hashem on their behalf.
Does this imply that the deceased possess free will?  If so, shouldn't it be permitted to directly pray to the deceased, just as it is permitted to pray to those who are alive and possess free will?  If not, what does attendance at the graveyard accomplish, and how does it arouse the deceased to pray to Hashem on our behalf?

To Serve and To Praise 12

The Gemara in Taanis 16a records that during the series of communal fasts ordained on account of drought, the Jews would assemble in the graveyard.  One of the reasons that the Gemara offers for this practice is "so that the deceased pray for mercy on our behalf."  Does this practice violate Rambam's fifth principle?

To Serve and To Praise 11

In the siddur of Rav Yaakov Emden, it states that the stanza "Borchuni leshalom" in the song "Sholom Aleichem" is not a prayer to the angels to bless us, for it is strictly forbidden to pray to angels.  Rather, it is a command to the angels to bless us.
How does this solve the problem?  If angels do not have free will, and thus cannot decide whether or not to bless us, is it not heresy to command them to bless us?  If Hashem already commanded them to bless us, why the need for our own command?  And if Hashem did not command them to bless us, how can we instruct them to act of their own volition?  Are we not thereby ascribing false power to the angels?

To Serve and To Praise 10

Perhaps the Gemara is not literally describing Calev's words of prayer.  Rather, it is expressing the great merit of the Avos, and the efficacy of that merit in assisting Calev's prayer.  It is as if Calev had directly addressed the Avos and requested their intervention - that is how powerful their merit contributes to the prayers of their descendants.
Is such a deviation from the Gemara's literal description appropriate?  Are we permitted to understand the Gemara as dramatizing the merit of the Avos rather than describing a historical account?

To Serve and To Praise 9

Bach in Yoreh De'ah, at the end of siman 217, cites Rav Chaim Paltiel, who claims that Calev was certainly not praying to the Patriarchs, as it is forbidden to address the deceased in prayer.  Rather, Calev was praying to Hashem, and he chose the gravesite of the Patriarchs as an appropriate location for his prayer because prayer is more effective in holy places.  Alternatively, Mishnah Berura, at the end of siman 581, writes that instead of addressing the deceased, one may ask Hashem to assist him in the merit of the deceased.
The language of the Gemara in Sotah (34b), however, indicates that Calev directly addressed the Patriarchs.  "He said to them, 'My fathers!  Pray for mercy on my behalf...'"  How can these two interpretations be reconciled with the language of the Gemara?

To Serve and To Praise 8

Every Friday night, many Jews recite "Sholom Aleichem," a greeting to the angels.  In the third stanza of "Sholom Aleichem," we ask the angels to bless us - "Borchuni lishalom, Malachei hashalom."  Is this request a violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of faith?

To Serve and To Praise 7

In the selichos recited before and during the Yomim Nora'im, prayers seem to be addressed to angels.  For example, every day of selichos concludes with "Machnisei rachamim," a prayer to the angels to intercede with Hashem on our behalf; "Malachei rachamim," also a prayer beseeching the angels to ask Hashem to have mercy on us; and "Midas harachamim," also recited at the end of Ne'ilah on Yom Kippur, begging the "Attribute of Mercy" to "overflow upon us" and "request mercy" of Hashem on our behalf.  Are these prayers in violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of Judaism?

To Serve and To Praise 6

In Maseches Sotah 34b, Rava records that Calev prostrated himself on the graves of the Avos and "he said to them: 'My forefathers, pray for me that I be saved from the plan of the spies!'"  The Gemara seems to approve of Calev's action.  Was Calev in violation of Rambam's fifth fundamental principle of Judaism?

To Serve and To Praise 5

According to this explanation of Rambam, praying to the deceased is a violation of a fundamental principle of Judaism.  Are the masses of Jews that flock to the gravesides of the righteous in violation of this principle?  Do they have an alternate understanding of Rambam's words?  Do they disagree with Rambam?  Are they simply unaware of this principle?  Or are they doing something other than praying to the deceased?

To Serve and To Praise 4

Based on this idea, Rav Yakov Weinberg, the late Rosh Hayeshiva of Ner Yisrael, claimed that prayer that is directed toward deceased humans violates this fundamental principle of Rambam.  Once a person dies, he loses his free will, and is no different in this sense than celestial beings, who are completely dependent on the will of Hashem.  Just as it is forbidden to pray to celestial beings, as they have no independent power, so it is forbidden to pray to humans who have died, as they too no longer possess independent power.  It is only to live humans, who still possess free will, that it is permitted to pray and serve.
Similarly, it is only permitted to praise humans for what they have done with their free will during their lifetimes.  Praising them for that which is done by Hashem is tantamount to praising the stars for that which is in the hands of Hashem alone.

To Serve and To Praise 3

Perhaps it is perfectly permissible to serve and to praise humans since they have free will.  Likewise it is perfectly permissible to pray to humans, i.e. request humans to provide for one's needs, since humans, by virtue of their free will, are capable of providing for those needs.  To serve and to praise celestial beings, on the other hand, is tantamount to idolatry, for such service implies that the celestial beings act of their own free will, when in fact they are completely controlled by Hashem.  To pray to these beings would also constitute idolatry, for such prayer implies that these beings have the power to grant the object of the prayer.
According to this, it would likewise constitute idolatry to pray to a human for something which cannot be granted by any being other than Hashem, such as rain. Such a prayer would imply that the human has Divine power.
This is why Rambam only contrasts service of Hashem with service of celestial beings, and not with service of humans; because in many cases, it is permissible to serve humans. It is only the ascription of Divine power to humans that is actually forbidden, whereas the ascription of any independent power to celestial beings is forbidden.

To Serve and To Praise 2

Rambam continues his elaboration of the principle that Hashem is the only One Whom it is proper to serve and to praise by contrasting Hashem with natural forces and celestial beings, whom it is improper to serve and praise because they do not act with free will, but are completely dependent on the will of Hashem.  Is Hashem the only One Who acts independently?  What about human beings?  Humans have free will; is it then permitted to serve them?  And why didn't Rambam contrast service of Hashem with service of human beings?

To Serve and to Praise

In the fifth of Rambam's thirteen principles of faith, Rambam asserts that Hashem is the only One to Whom it is proper to serve and to praise.  (I'm talking about the real Rambam, not the 13 ani maamins in the siddur alleged to be based on Rambam)  Does this mean that it is forbidden to praise people?  Does it mean that it is forbidden to serve people?  Is there a difference between serving someone by bowing down to him and serving him a cup of coffee?  If so, what is the difference?

The Place Of Morality In Halacha 2

Although two witnesses are generally required by Halacha in order to establish the truth of an event, a woman may remarry based on the testimony of one witness that her husband died.  Moreover, witnesses that are ordinarily disqualified from testimony are accepted for testimony regarding the death of a woman's husband, as that testimony would allow her to remarry.
Why is this case an exception to the rule?  Is it not the moral consideration of the woman's plight that caused the sages to relax the Halachic requirements of testimony?  Does this indicate that moral considerations influence Halachic decisions?

Trust and Effort

Is it proper to exert minimal effort in the pursuit of a livelihood, and trust in G-d to endow that effort with success?  Or should one anticipate the potential failure of minimal effort, and increase effort to provide for multiple contingencies?